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The purpose of this paper is to show how Locke's view of primary and 
secondary qualities can withstand Berkeley's objection that all qualities, 
including primary ones, exist only in the mind. Before advancing Locke's 
position it is necessary to define two terms which will be used throughout this 
paper: "idea" and "quality." "Idea" will refer to the perception the mind has of an 
object or body through the senses. "Quality" will refer to a trait which is 
characteristic of a substance. Furthermore, qualities exist in the external world 
and ideas exist in the mind. Even though Locke gives different definitions of 
"idea" and "quality" he often uses the words interchangeably. Thus, it is 
necessary to draw the above distinction for the purposes of clarity in this paper. 
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke expounds on the 
differences between primary and secondary qualities. He contends that all 
material things exist in a three-dimensional external world. To examine this 
view it is necessary to define "substance," determine the relationship between 
powers and secondary qualities and analyze the primary/secondary quality 
distinction. It is this overview of Locke's position which will later enable one to 
understand Berkeley's misinterpretation of the primary/secondary quality 
relationship. 
Locke suggests that our understanding of substances results from the mind 
grouping simultaneous sensory inputs into ideas. Moreover, these sensory 
inputs, which are transformed into ideas, are caused by the actual substance. 
For instance, if a man looks at the sun his mind will register intense light, 
warmth, a reddish color, as well as a certain size and position from which these 
other traits radiate. Consequently, whenever all of the sensory inputs occur 
together he will recognize the stimuli as his experience of the sun. Thus, the 
word "sun" originates from the observed interaction of these traits. To express 
this thought, Locke states that: 
the mind ... takes notice also that a certain number of 
these simple ideas [he really means qualities] go constantly 
together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and 
words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use 
of for quick dispatch, are so united in one subject, by one name. 
(Book II, Chap. XXIII, Sec. I, 390) 
Therefore, Locke claims that although one refers to the sun as if it were one idea; 
it is actually representative of many simple ideas of qualities. 
However, Locke notes that it is doubtful that these simple qualities can exist 
by themselves, since it is necessary that they adhere or dwell in something which 
will unite them. After all, these simple qualities must reside in an ordered 
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substratum; otherwise an individual would not come into contact with the same 
combinations of qualities. Thus, an individual would not be able to communicate 
ideas about those qualities to others in standard linguistic terms. Since it is 
essential that these qualities are inextricably linked to the substance in order to 
explain the repeated phenomenon found in the external world, Locke defines 
substance as "the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find 
existing, which we imagine cannot subsist without something to support them" 
(Book II, Chap. XXIII, Sec. 2, 392). Hence, whenever an individual imagines an 
object he conjures up the conglomeration of simple ideas, based on its qualities, 
that he has learned to associate with this object. Even though individuals also 
assume that these qualities co-exist in a substratum, they are unable to reduce 
these qualities and directly encounter the true essence of the substratum. Thus, 
Locke concludes that the analysis of substance will remain obscure, since 
individuals are unable to determine the nature of the substratum the simple 
qualities exist within. They are only able to conclude that these qualities adhere to 
"something." However, the substratum plays no further role in the primary and 
secondary quality distinction. In conclusion, Locke admits that his definition of 
substance is vague, but contends that a better definition does not exist. 
Next, in order to discover the true nature of secondary qualities, it is 
necessary to examine the relationship between powers and qualities. In this 
case, all powers are actions one substance performs on another. Power is further 
described as "virtually an idea of a quality presented in sense" (Book II, Chap. 
XXIII, Sec. 8, 398). For instance, Locke explains that a lodestone is capable of 
attracting iron and conversely, iron is drawn to a lodestone. Thus, these 
"powers" enable the individual to identify substances by observing their behavior 
with respect to other substances. A further illustration can be seen by examining 
fire. When an individual builds a fire he notices both its color and temperature. 
In time, he may also notice that the wood is transformed by the fire into charcoal. 
Thus, after observing these traits through the senses the individual begins to 
develop a complex idea of fire based on the powers and secondary qualities. In the 
above case, our ideas of the temperature and color of the fire are caused by the 
secondary qualities which are powers of the fire to cause changes in us. 
Moreover, when the senses pick up these qualities and powers in the substance, 
ideas of the qualities are formed in the mind. However, even though the 
individual has an idea of the power associated with the substance in the mind, 
Locke stresses that the powers are inextricably rooted in the substance in the 
external world. Therefore, the idea is the result of the exterior power working on 
the individual. Finally, it should be noted that the idea based on the secondary 
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qualities is distorted because these qualities and powers are unable to provide an 
accurate representation of a substance. 
Subsequently, Locke states that "powers make a great part of our complex 
ideas of substances; since their secondary qualities are those which in most of 
them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another, and 
commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of 
them" (Book II, Chap. XXIII, Sec. 8). Locke attributes this reliance on powers for 
identification to the inability of our senses to uncover the hidden traits of 
substances which make up their essential core. However, since we are forced to 
rely on our limited sensory input, we can only identify different substances by 
appealing to their secondary qualities which are the powers to cause our minds to 
have the ideas of secondary qualities. 
One can better understand this relationship by considering the components 
of an oriental rug. On the surface the rug is red and soft. These traits are parallel 
to the color and feel of secondary qualities. Moreover, these traits are found 
within the threads of the rug. This thread is considered a power since it can act 
on the senses and leave an idea in the mind. An example of this would be a foot 
standing on the rug. The imprint left shows one of the powers by which the rug 
can be identified. Moreover, the foot feels the softness and the attached person 
sees the color of the rug. Furthermore, the mesh canvas the thread is wound 
through is parallel to the primary qualities. It is this canvas which is the true 
essence or framework of the rug. However, even though the canvas is the 
unchanging essence, it cannot be directly experienced. The secondary qualities 
and powers can be experienced only through the senses. Thus, the individual 
would call the rug red, soft and imprintable. However, these qualities are all 
distortions and do not suggest that the canvas is the true unchanging substance. 
Hence, secondary qualities exist in the world as powers which create a distorted 
content of our representations, and primary qualities exist in the world as they 
are represented. This is why ideas of primary qualities are accurate 
representations and ideas of secondary qualities are distortions. 
Finally, it is necessary to distinguish primary and secondary qualities 
since it is this distinction which Berkeley will later question. Locke states that 
there are three components of a substance: primary qualities, sensible secondary 
qualities and active/passive powers. Primary qualities exist in every substance 
even though they are not always experienced by the senses. Therefore, their 
existence does not depend on the awareness of the individual. These qualities are 
inherent parts of substances. Locke lists 'bulk, figure, number, situation and 
motion of parts of bodies" as the primary qualities (Book II, Chap. XXIII, Sec. 9, 
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399). For Locke, the purpose of this list is to show what qualities capture a 
substance's true essence. Moreover, these characteristics should remain 
unchanging, regardless of outside factors, because their existence gives the 
substance its identity. Thus, the list presented by Locke illustrates the type of 
qualities that might fall into this category. It should not be taken as a final 
checklist with which to compare the qualities of a substance, but rather as a 
working model helpful in illustrating his definition of fixed versus fluctuating 
qualities. Therefore when Locke refers to primary qualities, he is not speaking of 
qualities that cling to a substratum, but instead of the actual substance itself. By 
this view, primary qualities are not really qualities at all, but the unchanging 
essence which i.a the substance. 
Next, Locke explains that secondary qualities are not simply ideas 
perceived in the mind, but the powers a substance uses to convey distorted ideas 
of the substance to the individual. Thus, secondary qualities differ from primary 
qualities since they produce distorted ideas of substances in individuals. In 
contrast, primary qualities produce accurate ideas of substances in individuals. 
It is for this reason that secondary qualities are considered quasi-qualities. In 
this case the only ideas in the mind are not the secondary qualities themselves, 
but the ideas of the secondary qualities. These ideas are conveyed through the 
powers. Furthermore, the ideas in the mind are the effect of the powers; thus 
they cannot also be their own cause. 
Finally, Locke shows that distorting powers are often confused with 
primary qualities because incoming stimuli from the externally world is derived 
through the senses. These powers ocCur when two substances interact. Locke 
explains that "the aptness we consider iil any substance, to give or receive such 
alterations ofprlmary qualities, as the substance so altered should produce in us 
different ideas from what it did before" (Book II, Chap. XXIII, Sec. 9,400). In 
addition, our only perceptions of these powers are those we observe through our 
senses. For instance, Locke shows that we are unaware of the changes the 
lodestone makes on the microscopic atoms of the iron because the change is 
unobservable by our senses. Furthermore, we would be unaware of any change at 
all in a substance if it were not for these powers acting through our senses. 
However, as noted before, the change we view is a distortion. Thus, Locke implies 
that humans can only unders4ffid the function of powers through the input of 
their senses; however there is also a microscopic level at which the powers of one 
substance act upon another which humans are unable to access. 
Consequently, this interior level, if discovered, would change the 
perceptions of different substances altogether. Locke states that: 
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In summary, Locke defines a substance as a set qualities united in a 
substratum. Moreover, he argues that substances are broken down into primary 
qualities, secondary qualities and powers. He further states that individuals 
identify substances by appealing to the distorted characteristics portrayed by the 
powers and secondary qualities. This occurs because a substance's primary 
qualities are not always readily accessible by the senses. In conclusion, Locke 
argues that primary and secondary qualities exist in the external world and the 
ideas of those qualities exist in the mind. 
However, in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 
Berkeley objects to Locke's claim that primary and secondary qualities exist in the 
external world. He first contends that the idea of a primary quality is like the 
primary quality itself. Moreover, since nothing can be like an idea but another 
idea, the quality must be identical to the idea. Furthermore, ideas are found only 
in thinking substances or minds. He illustrates this point by stating that it "is 
evident from what we have already shown that extension, figure, and motion are 
only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another 
idea, and that consequently neither they nor heir archetypes can exist in an 
unperceiving substance" (Part I, Sec. 9, 26). Moreover, primary and secondary 
qualities are inextricably linked. Berkeley states that "those original qualities are 
inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought 
capable of being abstracted from them" (Part I, Sec. 10, 27). Therefore, since 
primary qualities are ideas that exist in the mind and secondary qualities are 
inextricably linked to primary qualities, it follows that both primary and 
secondary qualities are ideas which exist in the mind. After all, only an idea 
could be grounded in another idea. Hence, Berkeley argues that there are no 
substances existing in an external world. There are only ideas of substances in 
the mind. 
In response to Berkeley's objection one must examine the flaw in one of his 
initial premises: an idea can be like nothing but another idea. A problem arises 
due to the misinterpretation of the word "like." For instance, when Berkeley 
contends that the idea of the primary quality is ill the primary quality itself, he 
13 
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uses the word "like" to mean the idea is "the same as" or "the quality." By this 
interpretation there is no difference between the idea of the quality and the quality 
itselfbecause the idea lil. the quality. However, this analysis is a misinterpretation 
of Locke. When Locke writes of ideas of primary qualities being like the qualities 
themselves, he means that they are similar in content, not nature. Locke never 
tried to imply that the idea and the organism were the same metaphysically, only 
that the content of the idea is an accurate representation of the organism. 
In fact, Locke's purpose for stating that primary qualities are similar to the 
ideas themselves was to show a further difference between primary and 
secondary qualities. To Locke, primary qualities are capable of accurate 
representations of reality. For instance, the idea ofthe size of a table I am 
working on is the "same" as the table itself, in that there is no distortion. Locke is 
simply trying to show that secondary powers do distort things and primary 
powers do not. Thus, Berkeley's claim that primary qualities are ideas and all 
ideas exist in the mind fails because Berkeley misinterprets Locke's use of 'like," 
and he is unable to prove that primary qualities are the same in nature as the idea 
of primary qualities. This premise is crucial to his argument. Therefore, when 
this premise becomes questionable his entire argument loses its credibility. 
In conclusion, Locke's claim that primary and secondary qualities exist in 
the external world overcomes Berkeley's objection that these qualities are ideas 
which exist in the mind. The main reason Berkeley's argument fails is that he 
twists Locke's interpretation for his own needs. A careful analysis shows that 
Locke does not grant that ideas of primary qualities are the same as the qualities 
themselves. Berkeley does not realize that Locke is simply elaborating on 
distorted qualities and true qualities. Thus, Locke's primary and secondary 
quality distinction overcomes Berkeley's objection, since Berkeley's argument 
rests on a misinterpretation of Locke. 
14 
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